Interview with Hubert Védrine

French former Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Vedrine poses during a photo session in Paris on April 11, 2022. (Photo by JOEL SAGET / AFP)

Franco-American relations

While Donald Trump has been back at the White House for a few weeks, how would you describe the current state of diplomatic relations between France and the United States?

Franco-American diplomatic relations cannot be dissociated from the global Trumpian wave, nor from this disruptive semester. Indeed, by adhering to the principle of ‘friend, ally, but not aligned,’ the French Fifth Republic was meant to preserve more independent thinking vis-à-vis the United States than other European members of the Atlantic Alliance, and to demonstrate greater resilience to sudden shifts in direction. Yet, first, this has been increasingly untrue for nearly twenty years. And secondly, even in ‘normal’ times, the United States has expected its allies to be aligned! In any case, since 1949, the United States has not only been the allies of Europeans but their protectors. This has now vanished, with Trump undoing the legacy of twentieth-century America—from Wilson to Biden—and ushering in a return to a nineteenth-century nationalist, expansionist, mercantilist, unilateralist, and anti-progressive stance. All this, despite the continued dominance of the dollar, the Pentagon, and now artificial intelligence, which have emerged in the meantime! French foreign policy can still adopt ‘positions’ and put forward proposals. But the relationship between France and the United States until 2027 will depend both on the political and economic state of France, as well as on the personal relationship between President Macron and President Trump, which is useful in the global turmoil created by the latter. It will also depend on whether Europeans manage to preserve cohesion—in trade, digital regulation, and ecological transition—and whether they succeed in providing guarantees for Ukraine or establishing a European pillar within the Alliance.

Since his return to power, Donald Trump has expressed a firm opposition to the commercial influence of the European Union, particularly through threats of significant tariffs. Should France be genuinely concerned about this, and does it have what it takes to shield itself from such measures? 

Donald Trump did not conceal his intentions: to impose the highest possible tariffs on all countries – whether they are allies or not is irrelevant to him – that have trade surpluses with the United States: the European Union (+25%!), but also Mexico, India, China, and others. The European market and the euro are bound to frustrate him! However, he will quickly face internal contradictions, such as a resurgence of inflation in the United States or the interconnection of value chains, and perhaps also encounter genuine European resilience regarding trade and the preservation of the legacy of Thierry Breton on platform regulation. In these areas, France shall take actions at the European level, as the treaties grant the European Commission exclusive competence in trade matters, while it has neither competence nor legitimacy in defence matters, regardless of its budgetary encouragements. The first half of 2025 will be a real turning point for Europe—either a harsh one, or, on the contrary, a creative one.

The initial measures taken by Donald Trump indicate a second term characterized by a reluctance to compromise. On the national level, the large-scale purges within his party and the administration are evidence of this. However, could the complexity of diplomatic issues and current conflicts lead him to adopt a more pragmatic approach on the international stage?

It is not certain that Donald Trump is hostile to all ‘compromise,’ but he wants to be able to dictate the terms in his own favor, as we have seen. In any case, he will have to choose between contradictory positions held by his supporters regarding his announced policies on trade or immigration matters. On the international stage, using Trump’s own language to assess possible scenarios and deals, one must distinguish his North American neo-imperialism (Canada, Mexico, Panama, Greenland) from other regions (Ukraine/Russia, Israel/Palestine, Saudi Arabia/Iran, and of course, China). One must then analyze, sector by sector, Trump’s assets and the forces resisting his plans.

France on the international stage 

Many highlight a loss of influence of France in international negotiations. Can the growing fragmentation of the internal political landscape in France affect, directly or indirectly, the role that France plays in the diplomatic arena?

This question of France’s loss of influence is a recurring and somewhat predictable theme, fueled by an incurable nostalgia for great power status. Your question is, sadly, quite relevant though. In reality, even though the United States is becoming a resounding and dominant ‘hyperpower’ again (if I hadn’t coined the term in 1997, it would need to be created now), it is the Western countries in general that no longer hold a monopoly on power, as they now face a world that contests or challenges them. Otherwise, Putin would not even have dared to launch his ‘special operation’ in Ukraine. Let us not forget that during the first debate at the United Nations General Assembly after this invasion, forty countries, demographically representing two-thirds of humanity, refused to take sides! Not because they like Russia, or Putin, and even less so the war, but because they reject alignment with the Western camp. It remains to be seen what this will lead to, with Trump’s attempt to reassert control—not as an ‘isolationist’ (Vice President Vance may be, but not Trump), but by adopting an even more unilateral and forceful approach. In any case, we will no longer be able to speak of ‘the West,’ as the values of Americans and Europeans are at odds. This relative loss of influence, particularly in relation to China and the ‘Global South,’ is also evident for Europe and, therefore, for France as well. In my opinion, it is also clumsy to claim to combat the ‘Global South’ on the grounds that it is heterogeneous and lacks democracy—except, of course, for India, Brazil, and South Africa! It is better to have targeted policies and to leverage the opportunism of each one of them. But you are right, there is a link that can no longer be denied between domestic conditions and external credibility and influence. Not so much because of the fragmentation of the political landscape, even though the lack of a clear majority in Parliament since 2024 is a handicap for governing France, but more so because of economic disengagement, unemployment, debt, lack of future investment, etc. If we are to return to fundamentals, the goal of France’s foreign policy should be to do everything possible to ensure that France maintains—or regains—control over its own destiny.

Some argue that France has always inflated its standing on the international stage. What do you think of this?

That is somewhat true historically—but so what? France has traditionally been inclined towards grandiloquence, which has generally provoked ironic reactions from its European partners, particularly toward the so-called ‘great nation’—a sarcastic term used by the Germans during the Napoleonic era. However, this line of criticism does not apply to the definition of foreign policy I have just outlined. It is clear that France’s foreign policy ought to be rethought and reframed in a more sober manner, focused on the essentials and its vital interests, stripped of a kind of rhetorical excess. Ultimately, it must be clarified what should continue—or be undertaken again—at the national level, or at the European level among the 27, whether under ad hoc arrangements or through enhanced cooperation.

France played only a secondary role in the recent ceasefire agreement between Israel and Palestine. The main French diplomatic actions in this conflict were indeed limited to public statements. Do you think France could or should have played a more significant role in this process?

France has recently played a humanitarian role in Gaza and a political role in advocating for a ceasefire in Lebanon. However, more broadly, let us not forget that no European country has played a central role in any major East-West international negotiations, particularly in the Middle East, for over half a century—despite their aspirations and rhetoric. Coming back to your question, it was François Mitterrand, a traditional friend of Israel, who, in March 1982—43 years ago!—became the first major head of state to consider the idea of a Palestinian state. France has played the role of a friend and supporter as long as there have been Israeli leaders who, despite opposition from extremists (as on the Palestinian side), have courageously attempted to find a territorial compromise: Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres, of course, but also Ehud Olmert, Ehud Barak, and even, eventually, Ariel Sharon. But since Benjamin Netanyahu came to power about a decade ago, relying on extremist parties, his priority, openly stated and effectively pursued, has been to ensure that there is never a Palestinian state. He had been quite successful—until the horrific events of October 7—in sidelining the Palestinian issue and neutralizing both Arab and European countries, including France, on this matter. Apparently, Trump’s adoption of the Israeli far-right’s ethnic cleansing plans further strengthens Netanyahu’s position. However, this would plunge the region into even greater chaos and bloodshed than it already faces. And if Trump truly wants to revive the Abraham Accords, will he be able to do so without securing something for the Palestinians—especially considering its incendiary policy on Gaza? Saudi Arabia will therefore procrastinate. Whether or not Israel strikes Iran again is secondary to this issue. In any case, neither France nor Europe in general will succeed in entering the game without the revival of a political process. After that, yes.

After announcing his intention to quickly end the Ukrainian conflict, Donald Trump mentioned conditioning U.S. support for Ukraine on access to its natural resources and encouraging Ukraine to consider a territorial compromise. What should France’s reaction be if this policy were to be implemented?

If Trump manages to impose a ceasefire in Ukraine and asks European countries to deploy their armies to ensure its implementation and monitoring (where? how?), the question is: what guarantees would the United States offer to each European country that agrees to take on this responsibility and assume this risk? France already voiced its opinion during the emergency meeting at the Élysée on Monday, February 17, being one of the only countries not to condition its military engagement on an American guarantee. This meeting highlighted the divisions between European countries. In which direction will public opinion lean? We will find out soon.

Avenues for international cooperation

Is strengthening the ties between Europe and the United States a key factor in enabling Western countries to regain decisive influence in current and future regional conflicts?

We are experiencing the exact opposite! A fragmentation of the conflating concept of ‘the West’ and an unprecedented weakening of the transatlantic relationship since 1949. Under Trump, there has been no Euro-American agreement on resolving any regional conflict. The ongoing conflicts between the U.S., Europe, Russia, China, India, Africa, and the Global South cannot lead to peaceful global coexistence or renewed international cooperation—temporarily swept aside by Trump—unless a historic compromise is reached between the still-dominant (Western) powers. Even so, it no longer makes much sense to group the U.S. under Trump, Europe, and the Global South under a single label. It is pointless to insist on proving that the Global South is not truly a cohesive bloc. Therefore, alongside the main confrontation—the United States’ refusal to allow any other country to become number one—there may be shifting and perplexing tactical configurations. In any case, European influence will only rise again if there is a real resurgence in Europe: working better and harder, investing more and more effectively, implementing significant but well-regulated legal immigration, pursuing a rational, science-based ecological transition, etc. And if Europe leads by example and stops imposing its “values” through sanctions and interference on countries that no longer want them, while remaining open to partnerships. Anyone can see that, politically, European countries are still far from this.

For a long time, you have been highlighting the illusory nature of the ‘international community’ and the limited influence of the UN in current conflicts. What advice would you offer for future large-scale international coordination attempts?

It was indeed fragile, but well-intentioned. Trump is now sweeping it all away. I take no satisfaction in having long foreseen that the so-called “international community” was more a hope and a horizon than a reality. To give it substance—and for nations to finally be “united”—we will need to find pathways to coexistence between established, contested, and rising powers, and to reformulate the noble principles of the United Nations Charter around what is now the vital interest of all humankind: preserving the habitability of the planet for five or six generations to come.