Social Media, Solitude, and the Acceleration of Political Polarization in France and the United States

Maia HOFFENBERG

Maia Hoffenberg is a student at Harvard College, Class of 2026.

In both France and the United States, participation in communal life is steadily eroding. By 2014, four out of ten French people only saw their families during a few annual gatherings, compared to one-third in 2010 ¹. In both countries, fewer people are participating in third spaces, groups that exist outside of the home and school or the workplace. The importance of community and civic engagement has also declined in recent years, with fewer people involved in neighborhood activities, volunteer organizations, and professional groups. The pandemic further accelerated this trend. Between 2010 and 2020, the isolation rate among young people in France increased from 2% to
13% ². In the United States, the decline in attendance at community centers, cafes, parks, and churches, which had begun long before the pandemic, only deepened ³. Twenty years ago, 42% of Americans regularly attended religious services; by 2024, that figure had dropped to just 30% ⁴.

Unlike physical communities, where bonds are formed through shared interests or mere chance, virtual communities often coalesce around emotional, polarizing, and sometimes violent content. Collective expression on these platforms is less about dialogue and more about assertion—whether through a comment, a meme, or an image—frequently amplifying negative emotions such as anger, frustration, and rejection

Seeking new forms of human connection online, users are often confronted with a mirror of their own beliefs. The algorithms of platforms like X, Instagram, and TikTok all operate similarly: they keep users engaged by recommending content similar to what they have interacted with, or at least what the algorithm believes they have enjoyed. This entraps them in “echo chambers” that intensify their initial convictions ⁵.

Human psychology is not designed to withstand continuous exposure to a singular narrative: repetition reinforces ideas, eliminates counterpoints, and thus silently radicalizes. Deprived of confrontation with differing perspectives, individuals gradually retreat into a narrowed version of themselves.

This process is self-perpetuating in the following manner:

1. In search of a sense of belonging, individuals migrate to social media.
2. They are exposed to content that strengthens their opinions and hardens their positions.
3. Their ideological stance becomes more extreme, distancing them further from meaningful debate and intellectual confrontation.
4. Increasingly isolated, they return to social media, drawing confirmation and comfort from it.

The very nature of digital interactions, through mechanisms such as “likes”, sharing, and algorithmic promotion, prioritizes engagement over accuracy and nuance. Extreme or misleading content typically generates more engagement (likes, comments) than factual information. Published more frequently and shared more widely, these types of content dominate the digital landscape, while the distribution of measured, balanced information naturally receives less visibility ⁶.

Our attention span is also declining as short form, endlessly scrolling formats proliferate. Nuanced discussions require time and reflection to be understood, while extreme or emotionally charged slogans immediately capture attention. In an environment where the value of content is measured by the attention it garners, exaggeration almost always triumphs over subtlety ⁷. Moreover, even on topics that lie far outside a user’s initial political preferences, platforms tend to recommend content aligned with the opinions already expressed. It thus becomes increasingly difficult to cultivate a hybrid mindset, one enriched by a diversity of perspectives from across the political spectrum.

But social media does not polarize without fertile ground: political scientist Ashleigh Aston points out that these platforms merely amplify pre-existing biases ⁸. According to her study, users with firmly established political beliefs are more likely to be exposed to misinformation, while politically neutral individuals do not significantly shift toward extremism as a result. Over a three-month period, the study shows that frequent consumers of information via digital platforms develop more populist attitudes. Similarly, those already attracted to populism tend to prefer these information channels, creating a self-reinforcing cycle.

In both France and the United States, polarization has its roots in local divisions that predate the digital explosion. In the United States, the most contentious issues include gun control, access to healthcare, and racial tensions. In France, it is workers’ rights (as illustrated by the Yellow Vest movement), secularism, and relations with the European Union that crystallize the divides.

Beyond this diversity, a common underlying dynamic seems to be at play: the growing divide between the winners and losers of globalization. In both countries, this rift fuels an increasing distrust of elites. In France, where political history has been marked by a vertical opposition between the ruling class and the working classes ⁹, this divide is now manifesting in the simultaneous rise of the far-right Rassemblement National and the far-left La France Insoumise parties, both in direct opposition to the centrist institutions embodied by Emmanuel Macron. In the United States, this dynamic is more recent but just as powerful: the Republican Party, under the influence of Donald Trump, has transformed into an anti-elite movement, not without paradoxes, as it continues to be supported by powerful financial interests. Here too, globalization, worsening economic inequality, and the erosion of trust in traditional institutions have provided fertile ground for polarization.

Rather than witnessing the Americanization of the French public debate, it seems, upon closer inspection, that it is the United States that is increasingly resembling France, where political opposition transcends traditional party lines and revolves around a broader contestation of the establishment.

Social media, then, are not the primary cause of polarization; they are the catalyst. They intensify ideological divisions, accelerate the dynamics of isolation, and trap individuals in increasingly impenetrable informational bubbles. Reducing this polarization will likely require less a reform of the platforms themselves than a more fundamental approach: reinvesting in “third spaces”, recreating physical venues for encounter, and encouraging the rebuilding of interpersonal connections offline. Globalization is irreversible; but the restoration of social bonds remains within our grasp.

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1.  Lucie Gruau, “La solitude gagne du terrain en France”, La Croix, 7 July 2014; Fondation de France, “Les solitudes en France”, 7 July 2014. ↩︎
2. Didier Potier, “Solitude et Covid-19: phénomène de société et enjeu de santé”, Mutuelle Saint-Martin, 18 June 2021. ↩︎
3. Melissa Cannon, Lynelle Bergman and Jessica Finlay, “COVID-19 Pandemic Impacts on Community Connections and Third Place Engagement: A Qualitative Analysis of Older Americans”, Journal of Aging and Environment, vol. 38, (no 4), 2024, pp. 381–397. ↩︎
4. Jeffrey M. Jones, “Church Attendance Has Declined in Most U.S. Religious Groups”, Gallup News, 25 March 2024. ↩︎
5. Matteo Cinelli et al., “The Echo Chamber Effect on Social Media”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 118, (no 9), 2021. See also Cass R. Sunstein, “Problems With Enclaves”, Sciences Po Law Review, vol. 27, 2025, pp. 44–48. ↩︎
6. Ashleigh T. Aston, “Modeling the Social Reinforcement of Misinformation Dissemination on Social Media”, Journal of Behavioral and Brain Science, vol. 12, (no 11), 2022, pp. 533–547. ↩︎
7. Lauren Gordon, “Watching TikToks At x2 Speed Has Given Me Brain Rot — Can I Be Saved?”, PopSugar UK, 2 December 2024. ↩︎
8. Ashleigh T. Aston, supra note 6. ↩︎
9. Bruno Patino and Ethan Zuckerman, “Media Polarization ‘à la française’? Comparing the French and American ecosystems”, Institut Montaigne, 6 May 2019. ↩︎